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THE EVOLVING LAW OF NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS: Do CURRENT TRENDS

MAKE GOOD POLICY?*
Henry Hansmann
LAW OF nonprofit organizations is currently in a state of
flux. Virtually all forms of law that bear on nonprofits - organizational, fiscal, and regulatory - look considerably different
than they did several decades ago. These changes are largely a
response - sometimes thoughtful, sometimes misguided - to important changes in the nonprofit sector itself. In turn, these
changes in the legal environment are likely to induce further
changes in the nature of nonprofit institutions. My objective here
is to provide some perspective on these developments by describing
the basic patterns of evolution in the law, by analyzing the
changes in the nonprofit sector that have stimulated this evolution,
and by evaluating the wisdom of continuing to follow the particular paths along which the law has been evolving.'
Because I shall be dealing with a large subject in a very brief
space I shall necessarily paint with broad strokes, neglecting many
important qualifications and countervailing themes. In particular,
I shall divide the law of nonprofits somewhat arbitrarily into three
categories. The first category is organizational law. Since most
nonprofits of any significance are incorporated, 2 the organizational
law which will be examined is primarily the law of nonprofit corporations. The second is fiscal law, a category in which I shall

THE

* This paper was prepared for the symposium on "What Is Charity?" at Case
Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, November 4, 1988. It is a considerably
revised and expanded version of a paper originally presented at the Independent Sector
Spring Research Forum, New York, New York, March 19-20, 1987.
I. This article contains general reflections on the development of a broad area of the
law, based in considerable part on my own research and writing in the area. Where possible, I have referred the reader to earlier works of mine that provide extensive documentation for the statements of fact I make here.
2. See generally Rudney, Scope and Dimension of Nonprofit Activity, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 55 (W. Powell ed. 1987).
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include all forms of general taxation (such as corporate income
taxes, property taxes, and sales taxes) as well as the special taxes
and user fees that support particular programs and services (such
as social security taxes, unemployment insurance taxes, and postage fees). The third category is regulatory law, in which I shall
include all forms of regulation that bear on the relationships between nonprofit organizations and other private persons (including
the law governing labor relations, torts, bankruptcy, securities, antitrust, copyright, and unfair trade practices). In addition, I shall
divide the historical development of the law of nonprofits into two
very broad periods: a formative period of consolidation and privilege lasting roughly from 1850 to 1950, and a subsequent period
of fragmentation and withdrawal of privilege that began around
1950 and is still underway.
I. A

CENTURY OF CONSOLIDATION AND PRIVILEGE:

1850-1950

Nonprofit organizations have a long lineage in Anglo-American law. Indeed, in the realm of corporation law nonprofit organizations have a far more ancient history than for-profit firms.3
Nonprofit corporations in the form of monasteries, universities,
schools, guilds, and hospitals have been commonplace for nearly a
millennium. Joint stock companies, on the other hand, only
emerged at the beginning of the seventeenth century.
Nevertheless, prior to the nineteenth century the law of nonprofit organizations had little definition as a distinct subject. In
that era corporation law in general, and nonprofit corporation law
in particular, were relatively ad hoc. Corporate charters were
granted individually by the legislature, and tailored to the particular organization in question. One consequence of this particularistic approach to the law was that the boundaries between different
types of organizations were left unclear; nonprofit, for-profit, cooperative, and municipal corporations blurred into one another (for
example, in guilds). Moreover, many nonprofit organizations were
not incorporated but rather were formed simply as charitable
trusts, and the law of charitable trusts remained an important
source of authority for most incorporated nonprofits as well.
The nineteenth century saw a remarkable explosion in the

3. For a detailed account of the historical evolution of corporate forms in England
and the United States through the end of the nineteenth century, see J. DAVIs, CORPORATIONS (1905).
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number of private organizations in society, both nonprofit and forprofit. Consequently, it was no longer feasible to incorporate or
regulate organizations by individual legislative acts. Furthermore,
it became important to have standard organizational forms so that
individuals could easily determine the type of organization with
which they were dealing. As a result, in the middle of the nineteenth century most American states adopted general statutes that
provided separately for the formation, as a matter of right and
without special act of the legislature, of three different types of
corporations: business corporations, nonprofit corporations, and cooperative corporations. The adoption of these statutes marked the
beginning of a century-long period, lasting roughly from 1850 to
1950, during which the organizational, tax, and regulatory law of
nonprofits achieved clear definition and evolved more or less in a
unitary fashion.
A. Organizational Law
The new nonprofit corporation statutes were the first and
most essential element in this process.4 They gave nonprofit organizations clear legal definition as a class, and they promised a
more flexible organizational structure than did the law of charitable trusts.
Moreover, the statutes gave nonprofit organizations a relatively unitary legal identity. Although they were highly flexible,
permitting various adaptations of the basic form, the statutes
nominally provided for only a single type of nonprofit corporation.
To be sure, as time passed, the courts, in their interpretation of
the statutes, began to recognize and treat differently one particular class of nonprofits. This class consisted of those organizations
that we might loosely refer to as "clubs." In essence, they were
cooperative-type membership organizations that had no important
activities beyond providing private services to their members, who
in turn provided most of the organization's income. Country clubs
and automobile service clubs were typical examples. The courts
permitted a partial breach for such organizations in the nondistribution constraint that is the essential defining feature of a nonprofit organization and which prohibits the distribution of the organization's net earnings to any controlling person, such as an
4. For a much more extensive analysis of nonprofit corporation statutes, see
Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L.

REV.

497 (1981).
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officer, director, or member. In particular, the courts sometimes
permitted clubs to distribute their accumulated net assets to their
members upon their final dissolution, an action denied to other
nonprofits, such as charities. Yet, this exception to the unitary
character of nonprofit corporation law was not terribly problematic. It was a pragmatic accommodation to the fact that clubs
came to be organized under the nonprofit corporation statutes
more or less by historical accident. It would probably have been
more appropriate to form clubs under the cooperative corporation
statutes or to create a separate membership corporation statute
for them, rather than creating special loopholes to accommodate
them under the nonprofit corporation statutes. Clubs are still
formed under the nonprofit corporation statutes; but until recently
- and, in particular, until the adoption of the new generation of
nonprofit corporation statutes discussed below - this exception
seems not to have generated much confusion.
The rationalization and codification of an essentially unitary
statutory law of nonprofit corporations reached its peak in 1954
with the promulgation of the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, a
joint product of the American Law Institute and the American
Bar Association. The Model Act was quickly adopted in a majority of the states, and remains the prevailing law in most
jurisdictions.
B.

Fiscal and Regulatory Law

During the period 1850-1950, nonprofits became clearly distinguished from business corporations not only under organizational law but also under fiscal and regulatory law. That hundredyear period saw the enactment of a variety of new taxes and regulatory measures that applied to business corporations. Nonprofit
corporations, however, were exempted from or given specially
privileged treatment under nearly all of these measures. Thus,
nonprofits were exempted from corporate income taxes and sales
taxes, while the traditional practice of exempting most nonprofits
from property taxes was continued and generalized.' During this
period nonprofits were also exempted from federal statutes governing involuntary bankruptcy, 6 collective bargaining,7 securities
5. For the history of the exemption of nonprofits from the federal corporate income
tax, see generally Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizationsfrom
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299 (1976).
6. The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 exempted nonprofits from both voluntary and invol-
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registration,' Social Security, 9 unemployment insurance, ° the
minimum wage," and unfair trade practices,'12 and were given
favorable treatment under the copyright'" and antitrust laws. 4 In
fact, legal favoritism toward nonprofits even went so far as the
creation, at the end of the nineteenth century, of the doctrine of
"charitable immunity" from tort liability, a doctrine previously
unknown to the common law. 5

untary bankruptcy. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, amended by Act of June
25, 1910, ch. 412, § 4, 36 Stat. 838, 839 (the purpose of the amendment was to confine the
exemption to involuntary bankruptcy), repealed by Bankruptcy Act of 1947, ch. 391, 61
Stat. 652.
7. This exemption was constructed by the National Labor Relations Board through
the exercise of its power to define the scope of its own jurisdiction. See Sherman & Black,
The Labor Board and the Private Non-Profit Employer: A Critical Examination of the
Board's Worthy Cause Exemption, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1323 (1970).
8. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 3(a)(4), 48 Stat. 74, 76 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 77c(a)(4) (1986)).
9. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, 643, § 907(c)(7).
10. Federal Unemployment Tax Act of 1939, ch. 2, 53 Stat. 183, 187, §
1607(c)(7)(current version at 26 U.S.C. § 3306(c)(8)(1986)).
11. As originally enacted, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat.
1060, amended by Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75
Stat. 65 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1986)), did not include a specific exemption for nonprofit organizations. However, to the extent that employees of nonprofits
were considered to be engaged in "non-commercial" activities, they were deemed outside
the Act's coverage, which extended only to "employees who are engaged in commerce." Id.
§ 5-8 & 12, 52 Stat. at 1062-64 & 1067, amended by Fair Labor Standards Amendments
of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, § 2(r), 75 Stat. 65, 65 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)
(1986)). See also Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879, 885 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1013 (1954). The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, Pub.
L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1986)), introduced a
separate basis for coverage extending to any "enterprise" operated for a "business purpose." Id. § 2(r), 75 Stat. at 65 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1986)). This
coverage has been interpreted not to cover charitable-type nonprofits. 29 C.F.R. § 779.214

(1988).
12. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914)(codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1986)).
13. As originally enacted, the Copyright Act of 1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652, contained no explicit exemptions for nonprofits. Its principal provisions extended only to activities conducted "for-profit." Id. § l(c) & (e), 61 Stat. at 653. The current exemptions for
nonprofits were adopted in the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 110, 111
(a)(4), 112(b) & 118(d)(3), 90 Stat. 2541, 2549, 2551, 2559 & 2567 (currrent version at
26 U.S.C. §§ 110, 1ll(a)(4), 112(b) & 118(d)(3) (1986)). Section 110(10), which also
contains an exemption for nonprofits, was added by an Act of Oct. 25, 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-366, § 3, 96 Stat. 1759, 1759 (current version at 26 U.S.C. § 110(10) (1986)).
14. See Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges &
Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654-55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965
(1970).
15. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
1069 (5th ed. 1984).
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Most of the fiscal and regulatory statutes in question here did
not by their terms provide special treatment for all nonprofits. Instead, the language of the exemptions generally pointed to some
vaguely defined subclass of nonprofits. For example, the Social Security Act of 1935 exempted only nonprofits serving "religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes."16 Nevertheless, in practice the statutes were often construed liberally to
extend special treatment to most of the important organizations
incorporated as nonprofits. This liberal construction was particularly evident in the interpretation of the federal corporate income
tax provisions. Although the tax code has always confined exemption to a number of specifically described categories of nonprofits,
those categories have been interpreted broadly enough to encompass nearly all nonprofits of any financial significance.17
II.

CHANGES IN THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE NONPROFIT
8

SECTOR1

Given the nature of the nonprofit sector prior to 1950, this
pattern of legal development was understandable. Aside from
clubs, most nonprofits were donatively supported organizations
providing services that had the character of a public good for
some substantial segment of the public - that is, they were traditional charities. Therefore, they could be treated as a unitary
class. They also could be easily distinguished, both in terms of
their finances and the services they provided, from the business
firms for which most fiscal and regulatory legislation was primarily designed. Moreover, the nonprofit sector and most of the organizations within it were small. Thus, there was little incentive to
work out approaches for extending fiscal and regulatory regimes
to them; it was easiest simply to exempt virtually all nonprofits
from the legislation in question. Finally, within corporate law, the
law of charitable trusts and, more recently, the federal tax law for
tax-exempt organizations could be relied upon to deal with most
of the difficult questions. Thus, there was little pressure to refine

16. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, 625 (1935).
17. See Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizationsfrom
Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 57-58 (1981).
18. For a far more detailed discussion of the changes in the character and role of
nonprofit institutions over time, see generally Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980); Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization,

in

THE NONPROFIT SECTOR:

A

RESEARCH HANDBOOK

27 (W. Powell ed. 1987).
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doctrine within nonprofit corporation law.
By 1950, however, the nonprofit sector had begun to have a
new look. It was becoming populated with large numbers of "commercial" nonprofits - nonprofits that were neither donatively supported on the one hand, nor clubs on the other, but instead had
the sale of personal services as their primary activity and derived
nearly all of their income from the prices charged for those
services.
In some cases these new commercial nonprofits presumably
play a fiduciary role toward their patrons which is analogous to
that which the more traditional donative nonprofits play toward
their donors and beneficiaries. The nonprofit form provides customers with an extra degree of assurance that the firm will not
behave opportunistically toward them when they are in a poor position to police, by themselves, the quantity or quality of services
provided by the firm. This may be the case, for example, with at
least some of the nonprofits that now populate the new service
industries that have developed rapidly in recent decades, including
residential nursing care, day care, home health care, and prepaid
group medical practice.
In other cases, these new commercial nonprofits evidently
serve no function that could not be served as well by for-profit
firms. As a result, these nonprofits are either anachronistic or opportunistic. This is arguably the case for many of those commercial nonprofits that have evolved from organizations that were formerly donative. Hospitals are a conspicuous example." Until the
end of the nineteenth century, hospitals were philanthropic institutions providing health care almost exclusively for the poor; persons
of means were treated in their own homes or in doctors' clinics.
Hospitals in that period were therefore charities of the most traditional sort, and the nonprofit form was essential as a fiduciary device for assuring donors that their contributions were being used
for the purposes for which they were intended. In this century,
however, through a series of technological and financial developments culminating with the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid
in 1965, hospitals have become mainstream service institutions
providing medical care on a fee-for-service basis to the public at
large, while performing little or no role in subsidizing care for the
poor. Nevertheless, seventy-five percent of general hospitals re19.

See Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise,supra note 18, at 866-72.
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main nonprofit today, presumably in large part as a consequence
of institutional inertia. They are anachronistic and perhaps also a
bit opportunistic, continuing to trade on whatever goodwill attaches to the image of a nonprofit organization, and enjoying as
well the benefits of tax exemption and other fiscal and regulatory
privileges that nonprofit status continues to bring. Furthermore,
by mid-century the nonprofit sector had begun to expand rapidly
in size - not only absolutely, but also as a share of GNP. This
expansion accompanied the growth of the service sector (and particularly the health care and education industries) in which nonprofits are primarily found.
III.

FROM

1950

ONWARD: A PERIOD OF FRAGMENTATION AND
WITHDRAWAL OF PRIVILEGE

In response to these developments, tax and regulatory law began a broad retreat from the consistently favorable treatment that
nonprofits had come to enjoy. In all areas, organizational as well
as fiscal and regulatory, the law abandoned the largely unitary
treatment that nonprofits had received in the past and began to
subcategorize them for purposes of applying different legal
standards.
A.

Organizational Law

Turning first to organizational law, we can see that the
breakup of the old order was already presaged by the 1954 Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act." In spite of the apparent success of
that act in securing broad acceptance among the states, it showed
serious signs of instability. The act clearly lacked any guiding theory of the functions appropriately served by nonprofit organizations, or of the structure appropriate to those functions. In essence, the drafters simply took the Model Business Corporation
Act and deleted from it all provisions that seemed inappropriate
for nonprofits, such as those dealing with the issuance of stock.
The result was a rather empty enactment. The statute is muddled
concerning permissible purposes for incorporation, vague and excessively permissive about distributions of net assets to members
on dissolution, and completely silent about the critical issue of directors' and officers' fiduciary obligations.

20. For a more detailed analysis of the Model Act and of the New York and California statutes discussed immediately below, see Hansmann, supra note 4, at 527-37.
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It is, therefore, not surprising that the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act was only a few years old when the nation's two most
populous states, New York and California, abandoned it entirely
in favor of newly drafted statutes of their own. Both states' statutes rejected the unitary approach of the Model Act and created
multiple categories of nonprofit corporations subject to different
rules.
The first to act was New York, which began drafting a new
nonprofit corporation law in the early 1960s and enacted the resulting statute in 1970.21 That statute created three different categories of nonprofits. The first provides for clubs and similar associative organizations, which are treated permissively in terms of
their fiduciary obligations. The second provides for charities,
which are subjected to relatively strict fiduciary obligations. The
third provides for nonprofits pursuing a "business purpose to
achieve a lawful public or quasi-public objective. '22 It is unclear
precisely what types of organizations were intended to be covered
by the latter category; the authors of the statute themselves were
apparently confused on the matter. Evidently they intended this
category to accommodate nonprofit urban development corporations that use public and private grants to help promote businesses
among the poor. But apparently they also intended it to encompass a broader class of the new commercial nonprofits. The fiduciary obligations the act imposes on nonprofits in this third category
are intermediate between those imposed on clubs and those imposed on charities. This appears to reflect the theory that since
commercial nonprofits perform activities similar to those performed by for-profit firms, they should not be held to markedly
higher standards with respect to the duties of care and restraints
on self-dealing that are imposed on members, directors, and
officers.
California followed in 1980 with the enactment of its own
statute,23 which is completely different from both the Model Act
and the New York statute. Like the New York law, the California
nonprofit corporation statute provides for three different types of
nonprofits. The categories are, however, defined rather differently.
The California statute contains separate provisions for religious nonprofits, which are subjected to weaker fiduciary stan21.

N.Y.

22.
23.

Id. § 201(b).

NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW §§

CAL CORP. CODE

1-1141 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1988).

§§ 5000-10841 (West Supp. 1988).

816
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dards than their secular counterparts. Such a provision had never
before been enacted by any American jurisdiction. Secular nonprofits, in turn, are divided into two categories which are denominated "Public Benefit" and "Mutual Benefit" nonprofits.
Although the statute is otherwise a model of careful draftsmanship, it is ambiguous as to the types of organizations that are
to fall within these two categories. As the names of the categories
imply, traditional charities are to be formed under the "Public
Benefit" category, while social clubs are to be formed under the
"Mutual Benefit" category. In keeping with this intent, Mutual
Benefit nonprofits are subject to weaker standards on self-dealing
and distribution of profitsthan are Public Benefit nonprofits. The
Mutual Benefit category, however, is defined to accommodate a
much broader group of nonprofits than simply clubs. By its terms,
its provisions can be used by a wide range of commercial nonprofits that are not membership organizations at all - indeed, that do
not even formally have members.
The drafters of the California statute were invited by the
ABA to draft a Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, which
has just been completed and published. 4 It follows the California
statute quite closely in nearly all important respects. In particular
it embodies the latter act's tripartite division of nonprofits into
Public Benefit, Mutual Benefit, and religious nonprofits. Since the
Revised Model Act is likely to be enacted in some form in many
states, its fragmented approach to nonprofit corporations promises
to become the national norm.
B. Fiscal and Regulatory Law
Turning to fiscal and regulatory law, we see changes in the
period from 1950 to the present that are even more dramatic than
those in the organizational law. The former pattern of more or
less automatically granting special treatment to nonprofits under
fiscal and regulatory legislation has been sharply reversed, and the
privileges that nonprofits previously had enjoyed have been progressively curtailed. Moreover, the pattern of fragmentation seen
in the nonprofit corporation law has also appeared in the tax and
regulatory law, which increasingly deals differently with different
types of nonprofits, or even with different activities carried on by a
single nonprofit. As with the corporation law, these changes have
24.

REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP.

AcT (1987).
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evidently been stimulated by the emergence of substantial numbers of commercial nonprofits and by the expanding commercial
activities of the more traditional donative nonprofits.
This broad retreat from favoritism toward nonprofits has
taken three forms. First, in some areas special treatment or exemption has been withdrawn completely from nonprofits of all
types. One of the first examples of this withdrawal was the abolition of the doctrine of charitable immunity in tort, a change that
was initiated by the courts in the 1940s25 and has now become

nearly universal. Labor law has seen a similar turnaround. In a
series of cases between 1970 and 1976, the National Labor Relations Board repudiated the long-standing "worthy cause" exemption that had shielded all nonprofits from federal labor law and
adopted a policy of treating nonprofit firms on the same terms as
ordinary business corporations.2 Similarly, whereas nonprofit
firms originally had the right to decline to pay Social Security
taxes, in 1983 the Social Security Act made such taxes mandatory
for nonprofits on the same basis as business firms. 7 In 1970, the
exemption of charitable nonprofits from state unemployment insurance taxes was eliminated, and the employees of such organizations were brought under the unemployment insurance scheme for
the first time.28 Finally, antitrust law, from which the courts had
until recently established a partial exemption for nonprofits, 9 is
now applied to them aggressively with little hesitation."
Second, fiscal and regulatory laws have begun to distinguish
among different activities carried on by individual nonprofits. A

25. The collapse of the doctrine was initiated most conspicuously by Judge Rutledge's opinion in President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
26. This process began with the decision in Cornell University, 183 N.L.R.B. 329
(1970), and was essentially completed with St. Aloysius Home, 224 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1976).
27. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 102, 97 Stat. 65, 70-

71 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 42 U.S.C.). There remains an exemption for employees of schools, colleges, or universities. 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(10)(A) &
(B) (1986).
28. Charities (more precisely, nonprofits that fall within § 501(c)(3) of the Internal

Revenue Code) remain exempt from the federal level unemployment insurance tax, however, and also still have the benefit of a somewhat preferential scheme of payment of their
state tax obligations. See generally Note, Preferential Treatment of Charities Under the
Unemployment Insurance Laws, 94 YALE LJ. 1472 (1985).
29. See, e.g., Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges &
Secondary Schools, 432 F.2d 650, 654-55 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
30. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85,
98-120 (1984).
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conspicuous example was the passage of the unrelated business income tax in 1950, a provision that effectively withdraws corporate
income tax exemption from the commercial activities of all nonprofits, including charities. 1 Indeed, this enactment can be taken
as the legislative event that most clearly inaugurated the new era
in the law of nonprofits. Efforts today to withdraw special postal
rates from the commercial activities of nonprofits provide another
example.32
Third, fiscal and regulatory laws have begun to differentiate
more carefully among types of nonprofit organizations, denying
special treatment to certain classes. The most striking example is
the withdrawal of tax exemption from life and health insurance
companies in the Tax Reform Act of 1986." 3 Formerly, as we
have noted, virtually all nonprofits, including most clubs, had been
exempt from the corporate income tax with respect to their principal activities. Although there were small classes of nonprofits that
were denied exemption, such as automobile service clubs, they
seemed to be flukes and special cases.3 4 The 1986 Act changes this
pattern, denying exemption to two very important classes of nonprofits. Moreover, the nonprofits in these classes were ones that
had formerly been exempted, not under the peripheral exemption
provisions of Section 501(c) of the Code that cover such entities
as cemetery associations and business leagues, but rather as charities under Section 501(c)(3), the innermost circle of exempt
organizations.
IV. A POLICY

EVALUATION

Is the path that the law has been taking for the past forty
years the appropriate one? The answer is mixed. The fragmentation of corporate law, with different standards for different types
of nonprofits, is in general poor policy. The direction being taken
by the fiscal and regulatory law, on the other hand, is salutary,
and more of the same would be desirable.

31.

Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 301, 64 Stat. 906, 947-53.
32. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, Reduced Postage for Nonprofit Organizations: A
Policy History, Critique, and Proposal, I1 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 347, 396 (1988).
33.

Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1012, 1986 U.S. CoDE
NEWS (100 Stat.) 2085, 2390 (codified at I.R.C. § 501(m) (1986)).
34. See Hansmann, supra note 17, at 94-95.

ADMIN.

CONG.

&
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A.

Organizational Law

The tripartite division of nonprofit corporations embodied in
the California Nonprofit Corporation Act, and in the Revised
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act that is based on it, is poorly
conceived to meet the needs of the nonprofit sector and its patrons.3 5 This is not to say that the Revised Model Act has nothing
to offer. In general, and in conspicuous contrast to the old Model
Act, the Revised Model Act is marked by careful and detailed
draftsmanship throughout. Moreover, the provisions of the Act applicable to Public Benefit nonprofits are, in general, well thought
out. They impose rigorous but by no means unrealistic duties of
care and loyalty on the officers, directors, and members of the organizations governed by this section of the act; consequently, they
help assure that the nonprofits formed under them will serve effectively as fiduciaries for their patrons, which is the principal function of the nonprofit form. The principal problem with the act is
that it does not extend these same standards to all the organizations incorporated under it, or at least to all organizations that are
not truly clubs.
1. Religious Nonprofits
It is particularly difficult to see the rationale for imposing restraints on self-dealing in religious nonprofits that are substantially weaker than those imposed on secular charities. The financial scandals recently disclosed in some religious organizations
make it clear that religion confers no immunity from peculation.
Why should we make it easier to defraud people in the name of
religion than in the name of charity?
The usual argument offered to justify a lower degree of accountability for religious organizations, in corporate law and elsewhere, is that higher standards would be excessively intrusive and
would interfere with the separation of church and state. But this
argument is unpersuasive, at least in the context of corporate law.
Indeed, one might argue that establishing weaker standards of accountability for religious nonprofits actually disadvantages religious organizations relative to secular ones. These low standards
result in a greater opportunity for fraud among religious organizations, leading to a spirit of distrust toward such organizations on

35. For an extensive analysis of the California act that applies directly to the Revised Model Act as well, see generally Hansmann, supra note 4.
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the part of those who would otherwise support them. This distrust
handicaps those organizations in raising funds and otherwise securing the commitment and support of the public.
It is a mistake to think of corporation law as a means by
which the state burdens organizations with duties to the state or
the public. Rather, corporation law serves the function of a standard form contract among the many participants in the corporate
enterprise. More particularly, nonprofit corporation law serves as
a standard form contract between the supporters of the organization, especially its donors, and the organization's managers. There
is no reason to believe that the optimal form of that contract differs between religious organizations and other philanthropically
supported organizations, such as secular charities. Thus, if the fiduciary standards chosen for secular charities are the optimal
ones, the ones employed for religious organizations must be suboptimal. It then follows that legitimate religious organizations and
their supporters will actually be handicapped by the new law. In
short, the best way to assure that organizational law neither penalizes nor promotes religion is to keep it from discriminating between religious and non-religious organizations.
Although the Revised Model Act does not go as far as the
California Nonprofit Corporation Act in providing weaker fiduciary standards for religious nonprofits than for Public Benefit nonprofits, it still establishes lower standards of accountability in
some significant respects.3 6 As previously discussed, complete uniformity of treatment seems the better course.
2.

Commercial Nonprofits

If the nonprofit form has become anachronistic for a particular type of nonprofit institution -

for example, hospitals -

then

presumably those who patronize these institutions no longer need
to rely on the special fiduciary constraints of the nonprofit form to
protect themselves. They can, and presumably often do, deal with
the organization much as if it were a for-profit firm. For several
reasons, however, it is not appropriate to hold the managers of
such a nonprofit only to the fiduciary standards appropriate for a
for-profit.
36. For example, public benefit nonprofits, but not religious nonprofits, must, upon
dissolution, provide the attorney general with a list showing the persons to whom the corporation's assets were distributed. REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. AcT § 14.03(c)
(1987).
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First, many nonprofits, including most of the new commercial
nonprofits, are not membership organizations; consequently, there
is no class of members to discipline the organization's management through the exercise of their vote. Moreover, even in nonprofits with members there is no possibility of disciplining managers through a market for corporate control, since unlike business
corporations nonprofits have no stockholders with a right to both
net assets and control. Fiduciary duties, therefore, are often the
only important constraint on a nonprofit organization's managers,
and this is as true for anachronistic commercial nonprofits as for
any other type of nonprofit. As a result, strong and easily policed
fiduciary duties serve an efficiency function even for firms that
are, in a sense, inappropriately organized as nonprofits.
Second, there is no easy way to determine which nonprofits
should be subjected to high fiduciary standards and which to low
standards. That is to say, there is no obvious set of objective criteria that could be embodied in a corporation statute to differentiate
among types of nonprofits for this purpose. Furthermore, it is
clearly inappropriate to allow the organization that is incorporating to decide which standards will apply to it - though this is
effectively the case under the Revised Model Act, which permits a
broad range of organizations to opt for the relaxed Mutual Benefit
form rather than the more confining Public Benefit form.
Third, if different standards are applied to different types of
nonprofits, patrons of those organizations will become confused
about the characteristics of the nonprofit form in general, and of
individual organizations in particular. This is especially evident
where, as under the Revised Model Act, nonprofit organizations
do not have to disclose to the public whether they are Mutual
Benefit or Public Benefit nonprofits.
Fourth, and finally, anachronistic commercial nonprofits can
simply convert to the for-profit form if the fiduciary obligations of
for them. Inthe nonprofit form become excessively constraining
3
7
so.
do
to
encouraged
be
should
they
deed,

37.

John Hetherington has argued provocatively that managers of mutual insurance

companies (which are nonprofit firms' for most practical purposes, though in legal form
they are consumer cooperatives) should be permitted to appropriate some of the net worth
of the firms' conversion to for-profit form, since this is the only way to give them an incentive to undertake such a conversion. See Hetherington, Fact v. Fiction: Who Owns Mutual
Insurance Companies, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 1068, 1089-107. Note, though, that this argu-

ment does not carry over to raking off profits from the firm prior to dissolution; rather the
contrary, since permitting such profiteering within the nonprofit form will reduce the incen-
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The better view, in short, is that commercial nonprofits
should be subjected to the same fiduciary standards as charities.
The only organizations commonly formed as nonprofits for which
reduced fiduciary standards are appropriate are clubs, which in
functional terms are not really nonprofit organizations but rather
are a species of consumer cooperatives that have crept under the
nonprofit corporation statutes by historical accident. 8 Yet the
Mutual Benefit provisions of the Revised Model Act are designed
to accommodate much more than just clubs; they are apparently
available to a broad range of commercial and even donatively-supported nonprofits.
Perhaps the best defense of the Revised Model Act in this
connection is that the drafters of the act seem not to have explicitly considered how the act is to apply to the emerging commercial
nonprofits. Instead, the act is drafted, and the commentary that
accompanies it is written, as if all nonprofit organizations could be
comfortably classified as either: (1) charities of the type covered
by section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code or (2) private
social clubs and other cooperative-type organizations that essentially do business only with their members and do not hold themselves out as being nonprofit.
A few simple amendments to the Revised Model Act would
go far toward rectifying the problems discussed here. First, eliminate the special provisions for religious nonprofits; second, make
the Mutual Benefit provisions available only to organizations that
have members and that receive at least fifty percent of their annual income from transactions with their members.
B.

Fiscal Law

One can essentially view exemption from taxes as a form of
subsidy to nonprofits. (This is most obvious for the exemption
from property and sales taxes, although it is arguably a reasonable
statement in the case of corporate income taxes as well.) Seen this
way, there is a good argument for removing the exemption from
commercial nonprofits that are anachronistic or opportunistic. Or,
to put it the other way around, there is no reason to subsidize the
nonprofit form of organization in an activity that can be performed as well or better by for-profit firms. With the advent of

tives to convert to for-profit form.
38. See Hansmann, supra note 4, at 582-85.
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large numbers of commercial nonprofits, it now makes sense to
pick and choose among nonprofits when granting tax exemptions.
Much has been said elsewhere along these lines about the rationale for tax exemption, its appropriate scope, and its consequences.3 9 Perhaps the most interesting question at this point is
not whether the scope of tax exemption will be significantly reduced in the future, but how. In particular, it will be important to
decide whether the law should proceed by "fencing in" or "fencing out." The federal corporate income tax has, in form, always
taken the "fencing in" strategy - it has presumed that nonprofit
corporations are taxable unless they are specifically "fenced in" to
the exemption through their inclusion in a specifically defined subsection of section 501(c) of the Code. In practice, however, the
exemption has essentially been administered on a "fencing out"
basis - all financially significant nonprofits have been considered
exempt unless there was a specific determination that they be denied exemption. Thus, automobile service clubs and political organizations have long been denied exemption, the former through
judicial decision 0 and the latter through specific exclusion in the
code.4" The 1986 revisions to the code have followed this same
pattern by "fencing out" nonprofits that sell insurance and annuities through specific language denying exemption to commercial
nonprofits in those industries.42
The alternative "fencing in" strategy would define, or at least
interpret, the existing categories of exempt organizations more
narrowly and place a heavier burden on nonprofits in any given
industry to demonstrate that, either as a group or in individual
cases, they qualify for exemption under one or another of these
categories. For example, the courts and the IRS could begin by
putting some coherence into the interpretations they give to such
broad terms as "charitable" and "educational" rather than routinely stretching these terms to accommodate those organizations
that do not fit neatly under another more specific heading.
The "fencing in" strategy is conceptually neater. However, it
is probably wise to continue for the present with the "fencing out"
approach, contracting the scope of exemption from time to time
by specifically excluding nonprofits in designated industries in

39. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 17.
40. See Hansmann, supra note 4, at 852-53.
41. I.R.C. § 527 (1986).
42. I.R.C. § 501(m) (1986).
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which the nonprofit form no longer serves a function for which
subsidy is appropriate. The reason this approach would be preferrable is that, as the economy evolves, there are likely to be more
cases of industries in which nonprofits played an important role in
the industry's formative stages but have become anachronistic as
the industry has matured. Therefore, as each such industry matures, there will come a time at which it is appropriate to remove
it from section 501(c) and thus withdraw exemption from a large
class of well-established and formerly exempt nonprofits. It will be
easiest to deal with this situation simply by making an explicit
judgment that, in the future, exemption is to be denied to nonprofits in that industry. Such a decision will often best be taken
through legislation, as was done with nonprofit insurance and annuity providers, but might sometimes be undertaken alternatively
through IRS rulings or judicial interpretation.
C.

Regulatory Law

There are several theories that might be invoked to justify the
exemption of some or all nonprofits from regulatory law. The most
obvious argument - although one that is seldom specifically invoked - is that nonprofit organizations are by their nature substantially less likely than for-profit firms to exhibit the behavior
that the regulation in question is designed to prevent and therefore
it makes sense to relieve both the organizations and the public of
the expense of the regulation. Specifically, one could argue that,
because the nondistribution constraint assures that no one in control of the nonprofit could profit personally by having the firm behave opportunistically toward the public, nonprofits are less likely
than for-profit firms to exhibit such behavior. (A related argument
is that the managers of nonprofits are more likely than the managers of for-profit firms to behave altruistically, presumably because
the nonprofit form with its nondistribution constraint tends to
screen for such types.) Thus, exemption of nonprofits from federal
labor law, when that was the rule, might have been justified on
the ground that the managers of nonprofit firms are less likely
than the managers of for-profit firms to drive a hard bargain with
workers. Indeed, one might have speculated that if nonprofits were
subject to the law governing collective bargaining, they would be
excessively inclined to yield to the demands of their workers and
would strike inefficiently generous bargains with them. Similarly,
one might have speculated that nonprofit organizations would not
be inclined to engage in an inefficiently large amount of risk-gen-
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erating behavior even if they were not subject to tort law; that
they would not make misleading statements about the quality of
their securities even if not subjected to securities regulation; that
they would not engage in unfair trade practices even if exempted
from the Federal Trade Commission Act; or that they would not
create or exploit a position of monopoly even if free of the antitrust laws.
It is, however, an empirical question whether, in fact, nonprofits are significantly less likely than for-profit firms to engage
in the types of activities that such regulation is designed to prevent. Theory alone will not provide much guidance here. After all,
a zealously managed nonprofit might well exploit its workers, security holders, and potential tort victims in order to serve its principal corporate purpose (provision of hospital care, relief of famine victims, etc.). We do not have good systematic data on this
issue. Casual empiricism suggests, however, that nonprofit organizations often behave as aggressively as do for-profit firms in a variety of arenas subject to regulation, including labor relations and
anticompetitive pricing. 43 This theory seems, therefore, to provide
rather weak support for regulatory exemptions, not only for nonprofits that are anachronistic or opportunistic but also for
charities.
An alternative theory is that, although the regulation involved might otherwise appropriately be applied to nonprofits in
general, exemption is justified as a way of subsidizing the organization. This theory acknowledges that the absence of regulation
will bring costs: exemption from tort law will lead to too much
accident-causing behavior by nonprofits, exemption from securities
regulation will cause some investors to be misled to their detriment, and exemption from antitrust law will lead to some monopolistic price-fixing by nonprofits. But the undesirability of such results would be outweighed by the fact that the increased revenues
thereby secured by the exempt nonprofits would go to good causes.
Under such a theory, exemption should presumably be extended
only to nonprofits that provide substantial external benefits to the
public at large; thus, charities should get the exemptions, but business associations should not.
This theory was explicitly invoked to justify charitable immunity from torts, and it is suggested by the title "worthy cause ex43. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85,
98-120 (1984).
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emption" that was given to the labor law exemption. Indeed, it
probably provided at least some of the motivation for all of the
various regulatory exemptions granted nonprofits. Yet the theory
is subject to the fatal objection that it effectively seeks to finance
nonprofits with taxes that are highly inefficient and that have distributional burdens that run from the merely regrettable to the
clearly grotesque.
It is, to be sure, possible to construct theories that might justify one or another form of regulatory exemption, at least for particular types of nonprofits. For example, it has been suggested that
exemption of donatively-financed nonprofits from involuntary
bankruptcy might be justified as an indirect way of establishing
an appropriate priority for the claims of donors, which would otherwise receive no recognition in bankruptcy.44 For each such rationale that has been offered, however, there appears to be some
other, less drastic modification of the regulatory regime besides
exemption that would better meet the needs that underlie the rationale. Thus, giving donors a claim in bankruptcy seems clearly
superior to exemption if the absence of such a claim is the rationale for the bankruptcy exemption. In short, most of the regulatory
exemptions that have been granted to nonprofits seem poorly
founded, regardless of the type of nonprofit involved. Continuing
the current movement toward their elimination is sound policy.
V.

THE LAW'S IMPACT ON THE SHAPE OF THE SECTOR

Withdrawal of fiscal and regulatory privileges for nonprofits
in any given industry will, presumably, lead to fewer and smaller
nonprofits in that industry.45 It will not, however, necessarily lead
to the disappearance of the nonprofit form from the industry. For
example, if tax exemption and other forms of special treatment
were to be withdrawn for most nonprofit hospitals, it is still quite
possible that the hospital industry would long continue to be dominated by nonprofit firms. In this respect one might expect the hospital industry to become somewhat like the life insurance industry

44. K. Mason, Exempting Nonprofit Corporations From Involuntary Bankruptcy:
Misplaced Compassion? (1983)(unpublished, Yale Law School).
45. There is empirical evidence suggesting that the availability of tax exemption for
nonprofit firms in some industries has led to the expansion of the market share of nonprofit
vis-a-vis for-profit firms in those industries. See generally Hansmann, The Effect of Tax
Exemption and Other Factors on the Market Share of Nonprofit Versus For-ProfitFirms,
40 NAT'L TAX J. 71 (1987).
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is today. In that industry, roughly half of all insurance is written
by mutual firms (which are effectively nonprofits rather than true
mutuals) that have arguably been anachronistic for more than
half a century but that continue to survive and prosper without
the benefit of a tax or regulatory regime that favors them over
stock life insurance companies.46
CONCLUSION

As the nonprofit sector matures, the law governing that sector
has been maturing as well. Despite the growing diversity of the
nonprofit sector, from a policy perspective it seems appropriate, in
general, to subject the sector to organizational law and regulatory
law that is unitary. The law should not discriminate among nonprofit organizations according to the purposes they serve, and in
particular according to whether or not they are charities. In fiscal
law, on the other hand, and especially in the area of taxation,
there is a good case for discriminating among different types of
nonprofits according to the functions they serve, and in particular
for being more discriminating than in the past by granting exemption only to organizations that are truly charitable.
In general, these are the lines along which the law has in fact
been evolving over the past four decades. Still, there are some conspicuous instances in which a less salutary direction is being taken
most notably in the area of corporation law.

46. See generally, Hansmann, The Organization of Insurance Compounds: Mutual
Versus Stock, I J.L. EcoN. & ORGANIZATION 125, 142 (1985).

